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569 
LITIGATING CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE 
PAY: AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY? 
RANDALL S. THOMAS* 
KENNETH J. MARTIN** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, executive pay levels at publicly held corporations have 
increased dramatically.1 Corporate boards have awarded Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) pay packages valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. Stock 
option compensation has led the way, with mega-option awards in excess of 
ten million dollars now common at Fortune 500 companies.2 Directors 
approving these staggering transfers of wealth justify them as “pay for 
performance.”3 
Many shareholders, especially institutional investors, have been upset at 
the size of these awards. While they accept the idea that managers should 
receive large financial incentives to improve their company’s performance, 
these investors find that these large pay packages are often accompanied by 
little or no improvement in stock prices or other financial measures of 
success. In some cases, the worst performing companies are the ones giving 
their executives the fattest pay envelopes. 
Although there are several methods by which shareholders may challenge 
compensation plans, their overall success in doing so has been very limited. 
Corporate law provides shareholders with three basic ways to influence 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. 
 ** Professor of Finance, New Mexico State University College of Business and Economics. We 
would like to thank Brian R. Cheffins, James D. Cox, Roberta Romano, Vice-Chancellor Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Robert B. Thompson, and the commentators and participants of the Washington University 
School of Law Institute for Law and Economic Policy’s conference on Corporate Accountability, for 
their extremely helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge our excellent research assistant 
Chad R. Vanisko for his help in putting the data set together. 
 1. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1999). Overall compensation levels at public 
companies have jumped by 264 percent during the period from 1993 to 1997. Id. For excellent survey 
articles on executive compensation, see Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in 
the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 
(2000). 
 2. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock 
Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 35 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 37. 
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corporate executive compensation decisions: voting, selling, and suing.4 
Shareholders’ ability to use their voting powers to reduce executive pay 
levels is weak. At the most extreme level, if a board overpays its CEO, 
shareholders can seek to remove the directors by shouldering the cost of 
proposing and promoting an alternative slate of directors in a proxy contest. 
These types of contests are rare and expensive.5 Today, they are usually 
launched at major public corporations when the company is the target of a 
hostile tender offer, never simply to dispute the size of an executive’s pay 
package. 
Shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-86 frequently attack executive 
compensation practices. A favorite of individual investors, these proposals 
seldom gain more than ten percent of the votes cast at a shareholder 
meeting.7 While many boards do appear to respond to the more popular 
proposals by reducing the rate of increase of executive pay and shifting 
compensation away from options and into salary and bonus payments, these 
effects are relatively limited.8 
Shareholders frequently have the right to vote on management proposals 
for stock option plans. Levels of shareholder opposition to these plans have 
increased substantially in recent years.9 In a few egregious cases, these plans 
have even been defeated. However, these votes do not appear to have slowed 
the rapid growth in stock option awards. 
Selling decisions can be effective if large numbers of shareholders dump 
a company’s stock due to concerns about its pay practices, but this is only 
feasible for investors whose portfolios have sufficient flexibility. Large 
institutional investors, particularly those whose holdings are indexed, may 
not have the ready option of selling their shares. In fact, it appears that few 
shareholders sell their shares out of frustration with firm compensation 
practices.10 
This Article focuses on the last of shareholders’ alternatives: suing. 
Shareholder derivative litigation has frequently been an engine for changing 
 
 
 4. See Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the 
Board’s Power to “Just Say No,” 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999 (1999).  
 5. For further discussion of proxy contests by shareholders, see generally RANDELL S. THOMAS 
& CATHERINE DIXON, ARANOW AND EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1 (3d 
ed. 1998). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1987). 
 7. Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1061. 
 8. Id. at 1069-70. 
 9. Thomas & Martin, supra note 2, at 47. 
 10. Letter from Stuart Gillian, Research Economist, TIAA-CREF,  to Randall Thomas, Professor 
of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law (June 15, 2000) (on file with authors). 
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abusive corporate practices.11 The well-tested claims of breach of duty of 
care, breach of duty of loyalty, and waste, are available when the appropriate 
facts support them. In recent history, a large number of determined plaintiffs 
have brought such claims, challenging abusive corporate pay practices in 
corporations.  
Are these suits successful? Using data from public files, this study 
examines a sample of 124 cases where shareholders have challenged 
executive compensation levels and practices at publicly and closely held 
corporations.12 This data set shows that shareholders are successful in at least 
some stage of the litigation process in a significant percentage of these cases.  
Our most robust result is that plaintiffs win a greater percentage of the 
time in compensation cases against closely held companies than against 
publicly held companies. This result is consistent for every stage of these 
cases; motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, trial, and appeal. 
We believe this result can be explained by the frequent presence of conflicts 
of interest and weaker procedural safeguards at most close corporations, as 
well as shareholder plaintiffs’ improved access to information where they are 
more actively involved in the company. This litigation may also be pressed 
more vigorously because compensation usually comprises a bigger 
percentage of the profits of a closely held corporation than in a public 
corporation. In addition, plaintiffs usually hold a larger percentage of the 
company’s stock and have had a falling out with the current management.13 
This may make them more resolute opponents in litigation.  
We also find that, on average, plaintiffs fare better in compensation cases 
in courtrooms outside of Delaware than in Delaware. However, once we 
control for the different composition of the Delaware courts’ caseload, these 
differences disappear and the overall success rates in executive compensation 
litigation are surprisingly similar.  
When we look at the procedural and substantive claims in these cases, we 
reach some other interesting results. Demand futility is a significant barrier to 
getting such suits off the ground. About half the time plaintiffs lose on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand. In Delaware, motions to 
 
 
 11. This point is well-illustrated by paging through any recent corporate law casebook. See, e.g., 
CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
(3d ed. 1999). The overwhelming number of cases influencing changes in corporate law are 
shareholder derivative actions. 
 12. See infra Parts II-IV for further discussion of these results. 
 13. One recurrent cause of shareholder litigation in close corporations are squeeze-outs of 
minority shareholders after internal disputes over control or management of the enterprise. For 
discussion of these cases, see generally F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S 
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 2000). 
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dismiss for failure to make demand are raised much more frequently since 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v. Lewis,14 although 
plaintiffs today seem to succeed in overcoming them a greater percentage of 
the time.  
The picture is more complicated with respect to the substantive claims 
made in these cases. Plaintiffs average about a thirty percent success rate in 
maintaining duty of care claims at the various stages of these suits with 
slightly higher success rates in non-Delaware cases. However, since the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,15 the number 
of these claims has increased and their likelihood of success at some stage of 
the litigation appears to have increased.16 With waste claims, plaintiffs 
succeed about forty percent of the time, while for duty of loyalty claims, they 
win about thirty-five percent of the time. For both types of claims plaintiffs 
are consistently more successful in close corporations than in public 
corporations. 
After reviewing the data concerning the historical disposition of executive 
compensation cases by the courts, in Part III, we ask more generally if the 
law is evolving to create more fruitful avenues for shareholder litigation. We 
consider two potential changes in the legal standards. First, we scrutinize the 
American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance and find 
that they create new obstacles for shareholder plaintiffs challenging 
executive pay abuses. Second, we examine the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
most recent opinion on executive compensation matters, Brehm v. Eisner,17 
and find that it offers little new ammunition for investors. We conclude that 
neither of these developments is likely to improve shareholders’ likelihood of 
success in derivative suits challenging executive compensation. 
Finally, in Part IV, we turn to a discussion of why the courts have not 
been more willing to scrutinize executive pay practices at public 
corporations. Historically, courts and commentators have offered several 
justifications for this practice: judges’ inability to determine appropriate 
compensation levels, a lack of legislative guidance on compensation 
practices and the fear of creating excessive amounts of shareholder 
litigation.18 We analyze each of these arguments against increased judicial 
involvement, and find them partially persuasive. We claim that courts should 
 
 
 14. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 15. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 16. This conclusion is a very tentative one, as we have relatively few duty of care cases in our 
sample, and our results are not statistically significant. 
 17. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 18. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. 
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have only a limited role in monitoring the procedural aspects of the executive 
compensation process and in policing the substance of outlier pay packages.  
We conclude that if the courts are reluctant to inquire into the particulars 
of executive pay packages, and the state legislatures are unwilling or 
incapable of taking action, angry investors will need to seek out other 
avenues for correcting abuses in the executive pay area. Some shareholders 
may seek to strengthen existing approaches to directly influencing executive 
compensation through coordinated voting campaigns. However, if 
disgruntled shareholders want to have a more immediate impact on the size 
and composition of executive pay packages, they will need to shift their 
focus to other factors that affect current practices, such as the accounting 
treatment of stock options and executives’ use of hedging transactions.  
II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION LITIGATION 
Shareholder litigation attacking a corporate board’s decision to give a 
senior executive a particular pay package faces both procedural and 
substantive obstacles. The main procedural hurdle that plaintiff shareholders 
must overcome is the demand requirement that applies in derivative 
litigation. Should the plaintiffs overcome this obstacle, they face serious 
substantive difficulties in proving a claim for breach of duty of care, waste, 
or a breach of the duty of loyalty. 
This Part examines the legal standards that apply in each of these 
situations, and looks at plaintiffs’ success in meeting them in cases attacking 
executive compensation at corporations. It is broken into three sections: (1) 
derivative claims and the demand requirement, (2) duty of care and waste 
claims, (3) and duty of loyalty claims. We then discuss some evidence about 
the differences in how courts scrutinize pay at close corporations and public 
corporations, and the differences in how Delaware courts and non-Delaware 
courts treat these claims. Statistics are presented in each section to illustrate 
how successful plaintiffs have been in litigating each type of claim. 
We obtained our cases from publicly available information in the Lexis 
and Westlaw databases and from citations in a variety of secondary sources 
on executive compensation. We gathered all of the cases that we could find 
where a court decided an issue about the process, size, or composition of an 
executive’s pay. Our earliest case is from 1912, and our most recent cases 
were decided in 2000. We cannot claim, however, that we have found every 
case on executive compensation over this time period, only that we have tried 
to do so. 
We read each case and recorded information on a number of different 
variables. These included: the date of the decision; whether the corporation 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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involved was closely held or publicly held; what type of motion, trial, or 
appeal was being decided by the court; what the outcome of that hearing was; 
what types of substantive and/or procedural claims were being raised; and 
what type of compensation was being challenged. Our final data set included 
124 cases from 24 states. 
Our sample limits our ability to address certain types of questions, which 
is inevitable in empirical research using judicial opinions. As Robert B. 
Thompson, a well-known author of such studies in the corporate law field 
wrote, “As with any empirical study, it is worthwhile to keep in mind what 
the study can and cannot do.”19  
There are two types of limitations that should be mentioned. First, for 
various reasons using judicial opinions as data means that we cannot answer 
questions, such as “how frequently do shareholders challenge board’s 
executive pay decisions?” Many challenges are resolved without litigation 
either through informal discussions between the board and the company’s 
investors, or by the plaintiff’s counsel and the company before the plaintiff 
files a complaint. Also, many cases that are filed settle without any decision 
by the court, or result in an unreported decision that does not appear in the 
electronic databases we used.20 Nor can we draw inferences about how happy 
shareholders are with the compensation practices of the boards of companies 
in which they invest because we cannot observe all of the different ways that 
shareholders may express their approval or disapproval.21  
A second problem that we face is selection bias. In an influential article, 
George Priest and Benjamin Klein claimed that the settlement of litigation 
does not occur randomly, but rather it is a function of the underlying 
 
 
 19. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1046 (1991). 
 20. The ratio of opinions issued to cases filed is usually low. For example, in an earlier study that 
we conducted of the Delaware stocklist statute, section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Code, we found ninety-one cases filed under the statute during the period 1992-1994. Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities 
Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 102 (1997). A search of Lexis-Nexus for Delaware chancery court 
decisions revealed only ten judicial opinions on section 220 cases during the same time period. Thus in 
Delaware, one estimate of the ratio of opinions issued to cases filed might be about ten percent. This 
estimate is probably quite high for most states, and even for Delaware historically, because it includes 
a large number of unreported decisions: of these ten decisions, only two were reported decisions. 
Delaware is unlike many other states in that its unreported decisions have precedential value and are 
therefore made available by the electronic case services, such as Lexis, at least as of the 1980s. For 
states which do not make unreported decisions available, then two percent might be a more realistic 
estimate. 
 21. These would include selling their stock in such companies, voting against the board of 
directors of these firms, and voting against the companies’ stock option plan proposals, to name a few. 
See Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1043-55 (examining several different methods by which 
shareholders make their views on compensation known to directors). 
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uncertainty about the applicable legal rules.22 Where the law is highly certain, 
the parties will usually be able to determine for themselves what the 
appropriate outcome of the dispute should be and, therefore, settle the matter 
without resort to a judicial decision.23 The cases that are selected for 
litigation, they claimed, are those in which there is greater uncertainty about 
the outcome.24 
From this basic proposition, Priest and Klein developed a second, much 
more controversial, claim that in the cases selected for litigation, the 
probability of plaintiff success approaches fifty percent.25 The underlying 
intuition behind this claim is that the cases most likely to be selected for 
litigation are those in which the plaintiff and the defendant both have a fifty 
percent chance of winning the case. This claim led to the creation of a body 
of empirical literature, which largely rejected the fifty percent hypothesis in a 
wide variety of settings.26 These studies consistently found that plaintiffs’ 
success rates are less than the predicted fifty percent. 
Kessler, Meites, and Miller have tried to explain these observed 
divergences from the fifty percent rule using a multimodal model that takes 
into account seven different factors that can account for deviations from the 
hypothesis.27 Two of their seven factors may be present in the data 
underlying this study: differential stakes in the litigation28 and agency 
effects.29 We will return to explore these effects after our discussion of our 
empirical results. 
However, we wish to emphasize that what we are most concerned with in 
this study is the relative rates of success of plaintiffs in compensation cases. 
We want to compare how plaintiffs do on different types of claims against 
different types of defendants. Their absolute success rates in compensation 
cases are less critical to our analysis. 
 
 
 22. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984). See also George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from 
Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985). 
 23. Priest & Klein, supra note 22, at 16-17. 
 24. Id. at 17. 
 25. Id. 
 26. For a survey of this literature, see Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-
Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases From Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
233 (1996). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Their claim is that the party with the greater stakes in the litigation is likely to have a higher 
degree of success in the litigation. Id. at 238, 242. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part 
II.G. 
 29. By agency effects, the authors are referring to the potential divergence between the interests 
of the litigants and those of their attorneys. Kessler et al., supra note 26, at 246. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Derivative Claims and Demand Futility 
Shareholders challenging board decisions to pay executives high levels of 
compensation almost invariably file derivative actions, claiming an injury to 
the corporation that indirectly harms its shareholders.30 Because derivative 
claims are claims brought on behalf of the corporation, they are subject to a 
variety of procedural safeguards. The most important of these safeguards is 
the demand requirement. 
In a derivative case, the shareholder must make a demand on the board of 
directors of the corporation to take action to correct the wrongdoing, or allege 
that such a demand would be futile.31 The Delaware Supreme Court has 
stated that the demand requirement has several benefits.32 First, it requires 
exhaustion of all intracorporate remedies, thereby possibly avoiding litigation 
altogether. Second, it gives the corporation an opportunity to pursue claims 
that its board of directors believes are meritorious, and to seek dismissal of 
the others. Finally, in situations where demand is excused because it is futile, 
or is wrongfully refused by the board of directors, the plaintiff shareholder is 
free to pursue its action in the manner it believes best. 
If the shareholder makes a demand on the board to pursue the action, then 
in most cases, this demand effectively shifts control over the suit to the 
board.33 Typically, a board will move to dismiss derivative litigation if a 
demand is made and, if the board appears to have acted independently and to 
 
 
 30. Attacks on executive pay are derivative because they typically allege that the company 
overpaid the executive and thus diminished the value of the corporation. 
 31. JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 15.1-22 (2001) [hereinafter COX, CORPORATIONS]. 
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) has proposed that states adopt a universal demand 
requirement. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1999). For further discussion of this proposal, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 32. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000) (quoting Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 
1216-17 (Del. 1996)). 
 33. The Delaware Supreme Court recently clarified the law in this area in Scattered Corp. v. 
Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997). In that case, the court held that a shareholder 
does not concede the defendant board’s disinterest and independence in every case where the 
shareholder has made demand on the board of directors. Instead, 
[i]f there is reason to doubt that the board acted independently or with due care in responding to 
the demand, the stockholder may have the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal. The 
stockholder then has the right to bring the underlying action with the same standing which the 
stockholder would have had, ex ante, if demand had been excused as futile . . . . It is not correct 
that a demand concedes independence “conclusively” and in futuro for all purposes relevant to the 
demand . . . . [A] board that appears independent ex ante may not necessarily act independently ex 
post in rejecting a demand. Failure of an otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to 
act independently is a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith or to conduct a 
reasonable investigation. Such failure could constitute wrongful refusal.  
Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted). However, plaintiffs who seek to establish wrongful refusal of a 
demand will undoubtedly bear a heavy burden. 
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have conducted a reasonable investigation of the allegations in the plaintiff’s 
complaint, a court will generally grant this motion. 
As a result, most shareholder plaintiffs in derivative actions will allege 
that demand on the board is futile. However, under Aronson v. Lewis,34 
establishing demand futility requires the plaintiff to plead particularized facts 
that create a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board of directors are 
independent, or that the challenged payments are not protected by the 
business judgment rule.35 It is a difficult burden to carry in the initial stages 
of litigation, especially because the plaintiff must do so without the benefit of 
discovery.36 
The plaintiff’s best hope is to show that a majority of the board of 
directors is financially interested in the compensation decision so as to satisfy 
the first prong of the Aronson test. This showing requires facts that would 
support such a taint of conflict of interest, facts that are more likely to be 
present in closely held companies than in public corporations. Many public 
 
 
 34. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 35. Id. at 814. Aronson illustrates the difficulty of satisfying this test. There, the court held that 
the first prong of the test is not satisfied where the executive whose compensation was challenged 
selected the directors and owned a large share of the company’s stock. Id. at 815-16. Rather, there 
must also be facts which show that “through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden 
to the controlling person.” Id. at 815. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive 
Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 212 (1996) 
(discussing Aronson and pointing out that these allegations will be difficult for a plaintiff to plead 
when she is not yet entitled to discovery).  
 36. The Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that derivative plaintiffs should take 
advantage of the “tools at hand” to develop the facts needed to meet these pleading requirements. See, 
e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266. In particular, the court has encouraged plaintiffs to use the Delaware 
books and records statute as a prefiling discovery mechanism to uncover evidence of corporate 
mismanagement. The idea is that a serious plaintiff shareholder will file a books and records case in 
the Delaware Chancery Court to obtain information about potential wrongdoing at a company prior to 
drafting a derivative complaint attacking the alleged misdeeds.  
 Plaintiff shareholders have not rushed to take up this invitation. As one of the authors wrote in an 
earlier article discussing this question, there appear to be good reasons for the lack of response. See 
Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding 
Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 360 (1996). These reasons include the fact that 
plaintiffs only obtain any access to corporate books and records in two-thirds of the cases filed under 
the Delaware statute, even when they seek to investigate corporate mismanagement. Second, the costs 
and delays involved in bringing such an action are considerable. Plaintiffs are in essence required to 
litigate and win a case in order to determine if they have enough evidence to meet the pleading 
requirements for their derivative claims. Finally, the Delaware courts have restricted plaintiffs’ access 
to those categories of documents that are “essential” to their investigation and, within this limited 
group of categories, required that the plaintiff “make specific and discrete identification, with rifled 
precision, of the documents sought.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266-67 (emphasis added). While this last 
group of limitations may serve the laudatory purpose of keeping plaintiffs from engaging in fishing 
expeditions using an expedited statutory procedure, they make the books and records statute useful 
mostly to plaintiffs who already know enough about the fraud that they can satisfy Aronson’s pleading 
requirements. 
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corporations have compensation committees comprised mostly, if not 
exclusively, of disinterested outside directors. The effect of such a committee 
is that it will often “erect an unsurpassable barrier in the plaintiff’s quest to 
challenge executive compensation.”37 
The second prong of Aronson requires the plaintiff to plead facts that 
show that the decision concerning the challenged compensation was not the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.38 The plaintiff is required to 
show that the board either failed to satisfy its procedural due care duties by 
not being adequately informed of all material information reasonably 
available, or committed waste, that is, failed its substantive due care 
obligations by making an irrational decision.39 Few plaintiffs are able to 
make a sufficient showing at this stage in the litigation to get over this hurdle. 
The facts in Aronson illustrate the difficulty that plaintiffs face in pleading 
demand futility in Delaware. Plaintiffs in that case challenged an 
employment agreement between Meyers Parking System, Inc. and its forty-
seven percent shareholder and director Leo Fink, who was seventy-five years 
old.40 Fink’s employment contract had a five-year term with an automatic, 
indefinite renewal each year thereafter paying Fink $150,000 in salary each 
year. Upon termination, Fink would continue to receive the same pay for 
three years, $125,000 for another three years, and after that, $100,000 per 
year for the rest of his life. All of these payments were to be made even if 
Fink was unable to perform any services for the company.41 In addition, the 
company made interest-free loans of $225,000 to Fink.42 
The complaint alleged that these transactions constituted a corporate 
waste. It claimed that demand on the board would be futile because Fink had 
personally selected the members of the board, that he dominated and 
controlled them, and that collectively the board controlled 57.5 percent of the 
company’s stock. Despite these allegations, the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that the defendants had not established demand futility and 
dismissed the complaint.43  
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the effect of the demand requirement on suits 
challenging executive compensation. Table 1 analyzes the frequency with 
 
 
 37. COX, CORPORATIONS, supra note 31, § 11.5. 
 38. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 39. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258-64.  
 40. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808-09. 
 41. The trial court noted that two other directors had contractual arrangements similar to Fink’s, 
but refused to consider this as evidence of alignment of interests because it was not included in the 
complaint. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 810. 
 42. Id. at 809. 
 43. Id. at 818. 
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which demand futility is addressed by the courts in the cases in the sample. It 
shows that out of the 124 cases in the sample, motions to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds for failure to satisfy the demand requirement are 
made in about thirty percent of the cases.44 
If we sort these data into Delaware cases and non-Delaware cases, we can 
see some further results. First, in Delaware, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Aronson v. Lewis appears to have caused a change in the frequency with 
which defendants raise this issue. Prior to Aronson, defendants made these 
motions in roughly the same percentage of cases in Delaware (fourteen 
percent) and outside of Delaware (eighteen percent).45 After Aronson, the 
situation changed dramatically. Motions to dismiss for failure to make 
demand were raised in seventy-five percent of the Delaware cases decided 
after Aronson, compared to only fourteen percent of the Delaware cases prior 
to that decision. Moreover, comparing Delaware and non-Delaware cases 
after Aronson, we find that these motions were made in only twenty-four 
percent of non-Delaware cases versus seventy-five percent of the Delaware 
cases. Both of these differences are statistically significant at less than the 
one percent level of significance.46 
Obviously, Aronson has had an impact on motion practice in Delaware, 
which is not surprising given the precedential significance of the decision to 
the Delaware Court of Chancery. What is somewhat surprising is its lack of 
impact in other jurisdictions. Delaware corporate law is often said to affect 
how other jurisdictions deal with corporate cases. It seems quite plausible 
that defense counsel would try to use Aronson as a basis for filing motions to 
dismiss for failure to show demand futility no matter where the case is 
brought.  
One possible explanation for this difference is the adoption by seventeen 
states over the past thirteen years of the Model Business Corporation Act’s 
(MBCA) universal demand requirement.47 This requirement forces plaintiffs 
 
 
 44. We do not separately discuss in the text cases where the plaintiff made demand on the board 
to take action. However, there were only two cases in our sample where the plaintiffs made such a 
demand. In one of these cases, the court found that the board had wrongfully refused demand and 
permitted the plaintiff to pursue his case, while in the other case, the court found just the opposite.  
 45. Using the Fisher exact test, we find that the difference between these cells in the table is 
statistically insignificant. For further discussion of the Fisher exact test, see 2 M. KENDALL & A. 
STUART, THE ADVANCED THEORY OF STATISTICS 580-85. 
 46. In comparing Delaware cases pre- and post-Aronson, we find a Chi-Square statistic of 16.588 
(p-value = 0.001). The post-Aronson comparison of Delaware and non-Delaware cases generates a 
Chi-Square statistic of 13.632 (p-value = 0.001). 
 47. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-742 (West 2000) (effective 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-722 (West 2000) (effective 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-742 (2000) (effective 1988); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-173 (Michie 2000) (effective 2001); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-742 (Michie 2000) 
(effective 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 630 (West 1999) (effective 1997); MICH. COMP. 
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to make a demand on the board of directors prior to filing a derivative 
action.48 Any dispute about the futility of demand from the litigation is 
eliminated, and, therefore wipes out all motions to dismiss for failure to make 
demand in cases originating in these jurisdictions. In other words, we will not 
see motions to dismiss for failure to make demand in cases coming out of 
these jurisdictions.  
However, the adoption of the universal demand requirement in these 
states is probably not a complete explanation of the difference between 
Delaware and other jurisdictions on the frequency of these motions. Most of 
these states are relatively small producers of corporate case law. Thus, there 
are only six cases in our sample for any of the adopting states, and all six of 
them originated prior to the adoption of the rule in those states. While we 
cannot say how many additional cases would have been included in our 
sample if these states had not adopted the MBCA universal demand 
requirement, it seems likely it would have been a very small number.  
In Table 2, we study the outcome of these motions to dismiss for lack of 
failure to make demand. Once again, we split our sample into Delaware and 
non-Delaware cases, and into pre-and post-Aronson decisions. We find that, 
on average, plaintiffs succeed in defeating these motions about forty-one 
percent of the time in the total sample, with slightly (but insignificantly) 
higher success rates in non-Delaware cases (forty-four percent) than in 
Delaware cases (thirty-eight percent). If we break the sample into pre-versus 
post-Aronson statistics, we see some potentially interesting results emerge. 
For the Delaware sample, we find that there is an increase in the percentage 
of these motions that plaintiffs win after Aronson, with a thirty-three percent 
success rate before that case, and a thirty-nine percent success rate after that 
decision. Although this difference is statistically insignificant, it does suggest 
that while Aronson has increased the likelihood of a defense motion to 
dismiss on demand futility grounds, it has not raised the likelihood of success 
for such motions. In the non-Delaware cases, we observe the opposite trend 
after Aronson, with a statistically insignificant decrease in the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success in overcoming a motion to dismiss on demand futility 
grounds. 
 
 
LAWS ANN. § 450.1493a (West 2000) (effective 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.42 (1999) 
(effective 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-543 (2000) (effective 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2072 
(2000) (effective 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.42 (2000) (effective 1993); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 55-7-42 (2000) (effective 1995); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14C (Vernon 1980) 
(effective 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-740(3) (2000) (effective 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
672.1(B) (Michie 2000) (effective 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0742 (West 2000) (effective 1991); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-742 (Michie 2000) (effective 1997). 
 48. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.92 (2000). 
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B. Duty of Care and Waste 
In those cases where the plaintiff can survive the procedural hurdles, suits 
challenging compensation practices still face important substantive hurdles. 
The courts have been very exacting about what plaintiffs must prove in order 
to win these cases. In this section, we examine the difficulties facing 
shareholders that bring two common types of legal claims made in executive 
compensation suits: breach of the duty of care (procedural due care) and 
waste (substantive due care).49 
Claims of a breach of the duty of care attack the procedures that a board 
has used, and the information that the board has considered, in making its 
decision about the challenged executive compensation package. To satisfy 
the duty of care’s informational requirements, the “directors must consider 
all material information reasonably available” to them.50 To meet its 
procedural burdens, the board should put forth “that degree of skill, 
diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar 
circumstances.”51 The plaintiff will have the burden of proof to establish that 
the directors were grossly negligent in satisfying these duties. 
In Tables 3 and 4, we present data about the plaintiff’s success in bringing 
duty of care claims. We should note that these data represent the outcomes 
from several different stages of the litigation, including motions to dismiss, 
motions for summary judgment, trial outcomes and appeal outcomes. We are 
defining success here to include five different types of events: (1) plaintiff’s 
success against a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, 
(2) plaintiff’s success against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
(3) plaintiff’s success against a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
(4) plaintiff’s victory in the trial court, or (5) plaintiff’s victory on appeal.52  
 
 
 49. While the courts have treated these claims as if they are separable, it is worth noting that 
there is a close relationship between determining whether the board’s processes are defective and 
determining whether they produced a rational result. In other words, one is unlikely to find a serious 
enough process violation to warrant a finding of gross negligence unless that violation resulted in a 
bad decision.  
 50. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259 (“The Board is responsible for considering only material facts that 
are reasonably available, not those that are immaterial or out of the Board’s reasonable reach.”). 
 51. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986). 
 52. Our justification for choosing this definition of success, rather than focusing solely on only 
final victories in the litigation, is two-fold. First, success at an early stage in litigation will often result 
in a favorable settlement of the case for the plaintiff. Thus, excluding early victories from the sample 
would have the effect of grossly understating plaintiffs’ success rates in these cases. Furthermore, in 
Part II.D below, we break our sample into the various stages of litigation to see how plaintiffs fare as 
they move further into the case. 
 Second, we are limited in the types of issues we can address with the sample that we have. While 
we would like to be able to examine questions such as, “Do courts treat duty of care claims differently 
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In Table 3, we see that the overall success rate for plaintiffs bringing duty 
of care claims is thirty percent for the cases in our sample. These percentages 
are approximately equal for Delaware (twenty-seven percent) and non-
Delaware (thirty-three percent) cases, with the difference being statistically 
insignificant. We also try to determine if the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom53 impacted success rates on duty of care 
claims. For the Delaware cases in the sample, we see a big jump in the 
plaintiffs’ success rate from zero percent for pre-Van Gorkom cases to thirty-
three percent for post-Van Gorkom cases, but this change is statistically 
insignificant. For non-Delaware cases, we see the opposite trend with success 
rates declining in recent years, although again the change is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 4 breaks the duty of care sample into public versus closely held 
corporation cases. We find that plaintiffs are more successful at closely held 
corporations than at public companies, although these differences are 
statistically insignificant. 
We turn next to waste claims. Waste is frequently said to be a difficult 
claim to support in executive compensation cases. If the executive has not 
participated in fixing the amount of her compensation, and the content of the 
pay package is approved in good faith by directors who have no financial 
interest in it, then a reviewing court usually will not examine the fairness or 
reasonableness of the compensation.54 Given the fact that most public 
corporations use compensation committees comprised exclusively of outside 
directors to establish executive compensation plans, these board decisions 
may be effectively immune from judicial review unless a shareholder can 
show that they constitute a waste of corporate assets.55 To win a waste claim, 
 
 
on a motion for summary judgment than when they go to trial?,” our relatively small sample size 
constrains our ability to do so. Nevertheless, we believe that some interesting information can be 
gleaned about the courts’ treatment of certain types of substantive claims by looking at their overall 
disposition of them. 
 53. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 54. COX, CORPORATIONS, supra note 31, § 11.5. This leading treatise states: 
In an attack on allegedly exorbitant compensation, the scope of [judicial] review depends on 
whether the recipient officers or directors have participated in fixing the compensation. Where the 
person compensated does not fix the compensation and the amount is set by directors without any 
adverse interest or influence that would prevent the exercise of a fair judgment, judicial review is 
very limited. It is considered outside the proper judicial function to go into the business question 
of the fairness or reasonableness of the compensation as determined by the board of directors. In 
contrast, if there is self-dealing because the directors stand to gain from their actions, the business 
judgment rule is not available, and the burden shifts to those receiving the compensation to show 
good faith and overall fairness to the corporation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 55. The waste doctrine holds that directors cannot give away corporate assets without any 
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the shareholder must demonstrate that the company failed to receive even 
minimal consideration for the compensation awarded.56  
Tables 5 and 6 present our results. In Table 5, we explore plaintiffs’ 
success rate for waste claims. As with the duty of care sample, we define 
success as defeating a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary 
judgment, or prevailing at trial or on appeal. We find that waste claims are 
the most frequently made claims in our sample with waste being raised in 
ninety-seven of our 124 cases. By comparison, duty of care claims were 
raised in only twenty of the cases in the sample, and duty of loyalty claims 
appear in eighty-two of our cases. 
Plaintiffs succeed overall about forty percent of the time that these claims 
are brought.57 If we compare the likelihood of success for claims made in 
Delaware cases versus non-Delaware cases, we find that plaintiffs succeed 
about forty-five percent of the time in non-Delaware cases versus twenty-
nine percent of time in Delaware cases, with the difference almost 
statistically significant.58 Splitting the sample between public corporations 
and close corporations, we see higher success rates for close corporations 
(forty-nine percent) than in public companies (thirty-two percent). These 
differences are statistically significant.59 
In Table 6, we investigate a different aspect of these claims. Here we 
examine whether waste claims are, as some assert, simply filler claims—
tossed into a complaint challenging executive compensation along with duty 
of loyalty claims or duty of care claims largely to help the plaintiff gain 
 
 
consideration. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362-63 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(“Under well-settled Delaware law, directors are only liable for waste when they ‘authorize an 
exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that 
the corporation has received adequate consideration.’”) (quoting Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 
176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993)). See also Sullivan v. Hammer, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 95,415, at 97,065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990) (“While there is a limit to executive compensation, 
courts have always been hesitant to substitute their judgment for the directors in ascertaining whether 
executive compensation is rational.”).  
 56. Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts to 
Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 170-71 (1995). The slightest benefit is sufficient, 
such as “if the board purports to award the compensation payments for an appropriate purpose such as 
to reward and retain the executives.” Id. at 171. 
 57. This relatively high success rate may be a reflection of the fact that it is difficult to knock out 
a waste claim prior to trial. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (“Claims of 
gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to disposition by summary judgment.”). Compare 
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338-39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that some waste claims can be 
eliminated on a motion to dismiss), with Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901-02 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (criticizing this result). 
 58. The Chi-Square statistic is 2.537 (p-value = 0.111). 
 59. The Chi-Square statistic is 2.891 (p-value = 0.089). 
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discovery. Those waste claims often allegedly rise or fall with the success of 
the other claims in the complaint. In our data set, we see a somewhat 
different picture emerge. Looking first at the top row of Table 6, we see that 
seventy-one percent of the time when waste succeeds, at least one other 
claim succeeds as well. By contrast, in row two of Table 6, we find that 
waste, either when alleged with other claims or simply by itself, is the only 
successful claim in sixteen out of eighty-nine instances. When we break 
down the figures further, we find that plaintiffs succeed on waste claims 
alone in fifteen percent of Delaware cases and twenty percent of non-
Delaware cases. Both of these figures are statistically significantly different 
from zero at the one percent level of significance. This shows that plaintiffs 
do succeed with waste claims even in the absence of other successful 
allegations.  
C. Duty of Loyalty  
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and to refrain from conduct that might injure the company and its 
shareholders. Where board members have a personal financial interest in a 
transaction, and vote to approve it, this action creates a taint of conflict of 
interest. This taint must either be removed through appropriate ratification by 
a disinterested decision maker, or the directors bear the burden of 
demonstrating that the transaction is entirely fair to the corporation. 
Empirical studies have found significant negative stock price reactions to the 
filing of derivative law suits alleging breaches of the duty of loyalty by 
boards of directors.60 
In publicly held corporations, most executive compensation agreements 
are negotiated between managers and the board’s compensation committee. 
This committee is comprised mostly, if not entirely, of disinterested outside 
directors. Its decision cannot generally be attacked on duty of loyalty 
grounds.  
However, at many close corporations and a few public companies, the 
officers set their own pay by virtue of their dual positions as directors. In any 
instance “when the recipient’s vote is essential to the grant of compensation, 
 
 
 60. Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings 21 (Oct. 2000) (working paper, on file 
with authors). This study also found no significant stock price impact for suits alleging breaches of the 
duty of care. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative 
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 281 (1986) 
(finding that judicial rulings on motions to dismiss in duty of loyalty cases had insignificant wealth 
effects). 
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the recipient has the burden to prove its reasonableness.”61 If no disinterested 
shareholder approval is obtained, the executive must show that the amounts 
received are reasonable. In making this determination, courts look at the 
following factors: 
evidence of the compensation received by similarly situated 
executives, the ability of the executive, whether the Internal Revenue 
Service has allowed the corporation to deduct the amount of salary 
alleged to be unreasonable, whether the salary bears a reasonable 
relation to the success of the corporation, the salary history of the 
executive, the relation of increases in salary to increases in the value 
of services rendered, and the relation of the challenged salary to other 
salaries paid by the employer.62  
This discussion leads us to expect that plaintiffs are more likely to be 
successful in bringing duty of loyalty claims in executive compensation cases 
at closely held companies. This hypothesis is supported by the data that are 
presented in Table 7. As with waste and duty of care claims, we again define 
success as defeating a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary 
judgment, or victory at trial or on appeal. 
Looking first at the totals column, we find that plaintiffs are more 
successful at closely held companies (fifty-three percent) than at public 
corporations (fifteen percent). This difference is statistically significant.63 To 
examine this result more closely, we next looked to see if there was a 
difference between how Delaware courts treat duty of loyalty claims and 
how courts in other states treat them. We found that for non-Delaware cases, 
loyalty claims succeeded in only five percent of the public corporations, 
whereas in closely held companies the success rate was fifty-six percent. This 
difference is also statistically significant.64 However, for Delaware cases, the 
difference in the plaintiffs’ success rates are smaller and statistically 
insignificant: public corporations (twenty-five percent) versus close 
corporations (forty-three percent). When we compare plaintiffs’ success rates 
on all duty of loyalty claims in Delaware (thirty percent) with those in non-
Delaware cases (thirty-eight percent), we find the difference statistically 
insignificant.  
 
 
 61. RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 122 
(4th ed. 1999) (general comments about § 122(5)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Chi-Square statistic is 12.99 (p-value = 0.001). 
 64. The Chi-Square statistic is 9.107 (p-value: 0.003). 
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D. Closely Held Versus Publicly Held Corporations 
As discussed previously, there are good reasons to believe that executive 
compensation decisions at closely held corporations are more susceptible to 
attack than those at public corporations. One obvious reason is that directors 
at closely held corporations are more likely to pass on their own 
compensation, thereby creating a conflict of interest claim for unhappy 
shareholders, whereas at public corporations, compensation committees are 
generally comprised of disinterested outside directors whose decisions are 
free of that particular taint. Less obviously, public corporations tend to be 
more careful in observing the procedural formalities necessary for 
compliance with directors’ duty of care. Boards act on a more formal basis in 
comparison to closely held companies, where the directors may all be active 
in the business and more familiar with one another. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that shareholders challenging compensation decisions at close 
corporations may have more information about the actions of the board—as 
they are usually more involved in the business and have a larger percentage 
of ownership—than shareholders of public corporations, who often know 
nothing more about the business than what is contained in the company’s 
filings for the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and who may hold a 
very small percentage of the stock. Finally, executive compensation tends to 
be a much larger percentage of the profits of a closely held corporation than 
at publicly held companies. This difference makes it a much more important 
issue for nonemployee shareholders, who are most likely to challenge pay 
packages. 
The close corporation cases frequently involve substantive review of the 
fairness of executive pay. These companies rarely employ independent 
outside directors on compensation committees, which results in officers who 
are usually directly involved in setting their own pay. Thus, if a 
compensation package is challenged by a disgruntled minority shareholder, 
the transaction is tainted with a conflict of interest, thereby leading courts to 
apply the entire fairness test. This test places the burden on the board to show 
that the amounts paid are reasonable by producing evidence, such as, the 
level of compensation at comparable companies, the job performance of the 
executives, and other data bearing on what similar individuals are paid for 
similar duties elsewhere. For all of these reasons, we expect to see that 
plaintiffs challenging executive compensation decisions at companies in our 
sample are more successful at close corporations than they are at public 
companies. 
In Table 8, we explore this question in our examination of court decisions 
at each stage of the litigation. We first calculate the success rates for 
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plaintiffs for each type of motion, trial, and appeal in our sample. We find 
that plaintiffs’ success rates at these different stages of the litigation vary 
substantially: motions to dismiss for failure to make demand (forty-two 
percent); motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (twenty-six percent); 
motions for summary judgment (twenty-eight percent); trials (thirty-nine 
percent); and appeals (thirty-nine percent). It is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions from these numbers. At one extreme, if we assume that plaintiffs 
are forced to go through every one of these stages of litigation, and win the 
average percentage of the time at each stage, then the odds of successfully 
prosecuting an executive compensation case are extremely small (0.0052 
percent).  
However, this estimate clearly overstates the hurdles that plaintiffs face 
for at least two reasons. First, not all plaintiffs have to overcome each barrier: 
some defendants may not appeal losses at trial, other defendants may not 
engage in motions practice to the fullest (or any) extent, and so forth. Second, 
as we noted earlier, plaintiffs that succeed in overcoming the initial defense 
motions will often settle their cases on favorable terms. In other words, a 
successful plaintiff will often end their case well before trial or appeal.  
If we examine the data further, we find that plaintiffs do consistently 
better in closely held corporations than in public corporations. For example, 
plaintiffs succeed much more frequently on motions to dismiss for failure to 
make demand at close corporations (sixty-two percent) than at public 
corporations (thirty percent), a statistically significant result.65 We find a 
similar pattern at each stage of the litigation, although the statistical 
significance disappears. This result is consistent with our earlier claims that 
directors at close corporations are more likely to suffer from conflicts of 
interest and use fewer procedural safeguards, while plaintiffs in these 
companies are more likely to have access to inside information without the 
benefit of discovery. 
E. Delaware Versus Non-Delaware Cases 
Table 9 summarizes some of the data that we presented earlier showing 
plaintiffs’ success rates in Delaware versus non-Delaware cases. It illustrates 
that plaintiffs have higher rates of success in the executive compensation 
cases in our sample in non-Delaware cases, than in Delaware cases for each 
type of substantive claim. While only the differences with respect to waste 
claims are statistically significant, taken as a whole, the results appear to 
 
 
 65. The Chi-Square statistic is 3.306 (p-value = 0.069). 
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show a consistent pattern of relative judicial hostility by the Delaware courts 
to compensation cases. 
If we look further at the underlying data in Tables 4, 5 and 7, we see that 
one potential explanation for these results is that the Delaware courts’ 
caseload includes a much higher percentage of cases involving public 
corporations than those of other courts. From Table 4, we see that for duty of 
care claims, seventy-three percent of the Delaware cases involve public 
companies, whereas only fifty-five percent of non-Delaware cases do. For 
waste claims, these differences are even bigger: eighty-two percent of 
Delaware cases concern public corporations versus thirty-five percent of non-
Delaware cases. Similarly, with duty of loyalty cases, we see seventy-four 
percent of the Delaware cases being brought against public companies, but 
only thirty-five percent of non-Delaware cases involve public corporations. 
The disproportionate number of cases involving public corporations that are 
in our Delaware sample most likely stems from the fact that about fifty 
percent of all American public corporations are incorporated in Delaware, 
whereas only five percent of the close corporations in the United States are 
incorporated there.66 
To explore this result, we compare success rates in Delaware and non-
Delaware cases for public and closely held corporations. In Table 10, we 
present aggregate data for our sample where we calculate the plaintiffs’ 
success rate on any claim divided by the total number of cases for Delaware 
and non-Delaware cases. The two sets of courts are surprisingly similar in the 
way that they treat these claims. In both instances, plaintiffs win around one-
third of the time in claims involving public corporations, and one-half the 
time in claims brought against close corporations. In examining the 
difference between success rates for public corporations and close 
corporations, we find that plaintiffs’ success rates in non-Delaware courts are 
statistically significantly higher for close corporation claims, whereas in 
Delaware courts the difference is higher but statistically insignificant. 
In Table 11 we present the results of a logit analysis of our data which 
confirms these findings. Our dependent variable is PWINS, or “plaintiff wins 
on any claim in the case.” Equation 1 shows that the dummy variable 
PUBLIC is negatively and significantly associated with success rates, but 
that the DELWRE variable is insignificant. In equation 2, we break out the 
data more finely, but see similar results. The only significant variables are the 
dummy variables for Delaware public corporations (DELPUBLIC) and non-
 
 
 66. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law 6 
(2000) (working paper, on file with authors). 
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Delaware public corporations (NONDELPUBLIC). Both have the expected 
negative sign. 
F. Shareholder Ratification 
Another important aspect of compensation cases is the presence or 
absence of effective shareholder ratification. If the company seeks a 
shareholder vote concerning whatever action the board of directors has taken 
after fully disclosing all material information concerning the action, and a 
majority of the shareholders approves the board’s actions, this action will 
insulate the directors from certain types of legal claims. Although there is 
some variation among the states over the precise implications of effective 
shareholder ratification, generally speaking, it makes it extremely difficult for 
a plaintiff to succeed on a duty of care or duty of loyalty claims. Waste 
claims, on the other hand, are unaffected by shareholder ratification because 
only a unanimous shareholder vote will ratify corporate waste. 
From the plaintiff’s perspective, they must contest the effectiveness of 
shareholder ratification if there is a favorable shareholder vote on the 
contested board action. The best way for the plaintiff to do so is to argue that 
some piece of material information was not disclosed to the shareholders, 
and therefore the vote has no impact. In our data set, we have thirty-one cases 
where the plaintiffs have contested the effectiveness of a shareholder vote 
ratifying the board’s actions. 
Table 12 presents this data. We divide the sample into Delaware versus 
non-Delaware cases, and cases where the court found shareholder ratification 
effective versus those where it did not. The results show that in situations 
where courts found shareholder ratification was effective, the plaintiffs 
succeeded less than ten percent of the time (the two successes were with 
waste claims). However, in cases where the courts found the ratification was 
ineffective, the plaintiffs succeeded in all of them. The difference between 
the plaintiffs’ success rates are highly significant.  
One possible interpretation of these results is that plaintiffs almost always 
lose when there is full disclosure and a shareholder vote ratifying the 
transaction. Another possible interpretation is that when courts believe that 
the plaintiffs’ claims are strong, they are more likely to find that the company 
has failed to disclose all material facts to its shareholders and therefore 
ratification is ineffective. Conversely, if the court believes the plaintiffs’ case 
is weak, it concludes that all material information has been disclosed and 
throws the case out. 
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G. The Fifty Percent Hypothesis 
Having now laid out all of the empirical results in the study, we want to 
return to our earlier discussion of the Priest-Klein fifty-percent hypothesis. 
There is a clear divergence in our results between plaintiffs’ success rates in 
compensation litigation against public corporations and close corporations. 
As we saw in Table 10, plaintiffs in close corporation claims win about fifty 
percent of the time in both Delaware and non-Delaware cases. By contrast, 
the success rates in public corporation claims are around thirty percent. Our 
interpretation of these results is that plaintiffs are more likely to succeed in 
executive litigation brought against close corporations than they are in 
similar cases filed against public companies. 
Is there an alternative explanation of these differences using the Priest-
Klein fifty percent hypothesis? First, we should point out that our results 
concern success at each stage of litigation, not ultimate success in the case. 
However, if each stage of litigation involves an independent decision to 
continue, we should see the parties making discrete choices about their 
likelihood of success. Second, we note that these cases should be appropriate 
for analysis using this model. The underlying substantive and procedural 
claims in both sets of cases are identical. The law in this area is well-settled 
so that it should be possible for the litigants to accurately assess their chances 
of prevailing on their claims. Delaware courts are renowned for their focus 
on certainty and consistency in adjudicating corporate disputes. All of these 
factors would lead us to believe that if the fifty percent hypothesis is correct, 
the success rates of plaintiffs in compensation cases should be fifty percent 
across the board. The statistically significant difference between plaintiffs’ 
success rates in close corporation suits and public corporation suits suggests 
that the Priest-Klein model does not explain our results. 
However, as we noted earlier though, Kessler, Meites, and Miller have 
identified two effects which may differentially impact plaintiffs’ chances of 
success in these cases.67 The first effect is the difference between the size of 
the stakes in litigation at public and closely held companies.68 While we lack 
data to attach values to such differences, we believe that, in general, 
 
 
 67. Kessler et al., supra note 26. 
 68. As Kessler, Meites, and Miller explain:  
[T]he party with larger stakes has more to lose from the litigation and therefore is likely to offer 
enough to settle the case, from the perspective of the party with a lesser stake, in order to avoid a 
larger loss at trial. Thus the cases that are selected for trial are likely to be ones in which the party 
with the greater stakes has a relatively better chance for success than would be the case when the 
stakes are equal. 
Id. at 242. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/5
p569 Thomas.doc  12/20/2001   9:18 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] LITIGATING PAY CHALLENGES 591 
 
 
 
 
compensation cases filed against public corporations will involve higher 
stakes than similar cases at close corporations. This difference should arise 
from a variety of factors. For example, the dollar amounts for executive pay 
are usually bigger at public companies than at close companies. Furthermore, 
an adverse judgment may have a larger impact on a public company’s 
reputation, or standing within the financial community. If these differences 
exist, then Kessler, Meites and Miller’s analysis suggests that they will lead 
public companies more frequently to offer enough to settle the litigation, 
thereby resulting in cases being selected for trial that have a relatively low 
success rate.69 This situation would result in lower observed success rates in 
cases involving public corporations, which would be consistent with our 
results. 
Agency costs, the second effect identified by Kessler, Meites and Miller, 
arise out of the method by which the attorneys litigating these cases are 
paid—hourly fees versus contingent fees—and who controls the litigation.70 
With respect to how the attorneys in these cases are paid, we again lack hard 
information on which to base our analysis, but we believe that it is likely that 
many compensation cases brought against public corporations are handled by 
attorneys on a contingent fee basis, whereas pay cases involving close 
corporations are more likely to be litigated on a hourly fee basis. The 
rationale behind this assertion is based on an author’s personal experience in 
litigating these cases and the observation that there is a far greater potential 
fee for representing a large class of shareholders in a public corporation case 
than in a close corporation case. The potential to represent a large class of 
shareholders makes it potentially more attractive for the attorney to take a 
public company case on a contingent fee basis. Kessler, Meites and Miller 
claim that this can result in a downward bias in plaintiff’s success rates in 
close corporation cases.71 
However, in determining the overall effects of agency costs, we also need 
to take into account whether the client controls the litigation. We would 
expect that the clients in close corporation cases would have much greater 
control over the conduct of the litigation than the investors named as 
 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Kessler, Meites, and Miller hypothesize that there will be two aspects to the agency costs 
analysis. They first ask if the attorneys are paid on an hourly basis or on a contingent fee basis, 
claiming that attorneys on a hourly fee are more likely to prolong litigation to increase their fees, 
whereas lawyers on a contingent fee contract will want to settle early. The second step of their analysis 
asks if the client controls the decision to litigate. If so, then the client will be likely to litigate more 
fully contingent fee cases than hourly fee cases because the client does not bear the full costs of more 
litigation in a contingent fee arrangement. Id. at 246-48. 
 71. Id. at 248. 
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plaintiffs in the public corporation cases. Here, we believe that investors in 
close corporations are more likely to be intimately involved in their cases 
because, among other things, they frequently arise out of personal disputes 
between nonemployee minority investors and employee majority 
shareholders. Public corporation shareholders are much less likely to have 
such a personal stake in their litigation; therefore, we would expect their 
attorneys to exert more control in these cases. In short, we believe that 
attorneys are more likely to control public corporation cases, whereas clients 
are more likely to control close corporation cases. Kessler, Meites and Miller 
claim that when “attorneys control the decision to litigate, then contingency 
fee contracts should be associated with a higher probability of plaintiff 
victory.”72 In sum, the agency costs analysis should lead us to predict a 
higher observed level of plaintiffs’ success rates for the public corporation 
cases than in close corporation cases. 
If we are correct in our factual assertions, the net effect of differential 
stakes and agency costs on plaintiffs’ success rates in compensation cases is 
indeterminate. The differential stakes analysis leads us to believe that public 
company litigation should have a lower observed success rate. However, 
attorneys’ control over the decision to litigate in the contingency fee cases 
brought at public corporations should lead to higher rates of success for 
public company cases. We cannot be sure which effect will be stronger and 
therefore cannot rely on them as a satisfactory explanation of the observed 
patterns in our data.  
Another potential explanation of our results could arise if there are a 
significant number of strike suits—cases with little merit that are filed solely 
to obtain a cheap settlement—brought against public corporations, but not 
against close corporations. If we assume that this may be the case, and we 
further hypothesize that public corporations either refuse to settle these cases, 
or settle them prior to filing a motion to dismiss the case, then we would 
expect the observed success rates for plaintiffs’ bringing actions against 
public corporations to be lower than for close corporations. Unfortunately, 
we do not have data to test this theory, although we note that it would allow 
us to accept both the fifty percent hypothesis and our earlier interpretation of 
the data. 
In conclusion, we would like to reemphasize that many other researchers 
have been unable to reconcile their analysis of observed patterns in litigated 
cases with the fifty percent rule. We have examined various possible ways of 
reconciling our results with the fifty percent hypothesis. We find none of 
 
 
 72. Id. 
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them completely satisfactory, and therefore conclude that our observed 
differences are likely to reflect real differences in success rates. 
III. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF EXECUTIVE PAY  
Are there any recent developments that may increase the likelihood that 
plaintiffs will be successful in executive compensation litigation? In this Part, 
we look at two potential changes in corporate law that could impact 
shareholder litigation over executive compensation: the ALI Principles of 
Corporate Governance Project and the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Brehm v. Eisner.73  
A. The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
project addressed the appropriate standards for judicial review of executive 
compensation decisions.74 The ALI Principles accept the proposition that 
corporate law should be more deferential to a board’s compensation 
decisions than other types of self-interested conduct.75 They offer three 
justifications for this approach: first, that “compensation arrangements with 
directors and senior executives are necessary in all cases;” second, that many 
compensation packages are recurring and widely publicized making it easy to 
draw comparisons between them and deterring overreaching; and third, that 
institutional procedures practiced by large public companies reduce the 
chance of corporations being disadvantaged by compensation arrangements 
which are unfair.76  
Substantively, the ALI Principles do not urge courts to make big changes 
in the way that they treat executive compensation decisions. They provide 
that interested directors or managers who receive compensation from the 
company may satisfy the duty of fair dealing by meeting any one of four 
 
 
 73. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 74. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.03 (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. See also James D. Cox, The ALI, 
Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Director’s Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1233, 1247 (1993).  
 75. The comments explain the rationale for applying “less intense scrutiny” in situations where 
compensation is involved than they would in other cases of self-interested transactions covered by 
section 5.02 (which requires, in part, that the self-interested transaction be disclosed to the corporate 
decision maker). ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 5.03, cmt. C. 
 76. Id. (pointing out that it is “good corporate practice” to have a disinterested compensation 
committees “to review and approve compensation arrangements”). 
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conditions discussed in the accompanying note.77 Section 5.03 allows for 
disinterested director approval of proposed compensation transactions but 
requires a stronger showing for after the fact ratifications by disinterested 
directors of the same pay packages.78 “Absent disinterested-director 
approval, the only other options are the more cumbersome and expensive 
process of obtaining shareholder approval and the less predictable burden of 
proving fairness to the corporation.”79  
However, when they address the procedural hurdles for shareholder 
litigation, the ALI Principles make life more difficult for shareholder 
plaintiffs attacking executive compensation.80 As noted in Part II.A, under 
Delaware law, shareholders must make a demand on the board to prosecute 
the action or take corrective measures, or allege that such a demand would be 
futile.81 To establish that demand is futile, shareholders must generally show 
facts that create a doubt that the board acted disinterestedly.  
The ALI Principles, however, chose to mimic the approach taken in the 
MBCA, and require demand in every case unless it will cause irreparable 
injury to the corporation.82 This requirement shifts the judicial inquiry about 
the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint to a motion to dismiss for failure to 
 
 
 77. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 5.03(a). These four conditions are as follows: (1) if “[t]he 
compensation is fair to the corporation when approved, id. § 5.03(a)(1); (2) if “[t]he compensation is 
authorized in advance by disinterested directors” or, if the compensation involves a senior executive 
who is not a director, “by a disinterested superior, in a manner that satisfies the standards of the 
business judgment rule,” id. § 5.03(a)(2); (3) if “[t]he compensation is ratified by disinterested 
directors . . . who satisfy the requirements of the business judgment rule” if (i) a disinterested 
corporate decision maker acted for the corporation and satisfied the business judgment rule, (ii) “the 
interested director or senior executive did not act unreasonably in failing to seek advance authorization 
. . . by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior; and (iii) the failure to obtain advance 
authorization . . . did not adversely affect” the corporation’s interests, id. § 5.03(a)(3); and (4) if “[t]he 
compensation is authorized in advance or ratified by disinterested shareholders” and is not a waste of 
the corporate assets. Id. § 5.03(a)(4).  
 78. Professor Cox argues that this heightened requirement stems from the fact that outside 
directors are less likely to be independent when faced with a “done deal.” Cox, supra note 74, at 1252 
(describing the difference between approvals of proposals and ratifications under section 5.02, which 
has the same language in this regard as section 5.03).  
 79. Cox, supra note 74, at 1248. If the compensation package is not approved by disinterested 
directors or shareholders, the proposals state that the burden is on the interested party to prove that the 
compensation is fair. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 5.03(b). See also Cox, supra note 74, at 1247. 
 80. See Cox, supra note 74, at 1249 (criticizing this approach and stating that “[a]ny 
improvements in the substantive treatment of overreaching conduct are eviscerated by the ALI’s 
conservative treatment of the derivative suit”). 
 81. COX, CORPORATIONS, supra note 31, § 15.7. 
 82. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 7.03(b). See MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1999). This 
“universal demand” requirement essentially shifts the pretrial battle to the board. Cox, supra note 74, 
at 1250 (pointing out that the ALI has made “the profound choice to regularize the process by 
requiring a formal presentation of the board’s or committee’s belief that continuation of the derivative 
suit is not in the corporation’s interest”). 
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state a claim. The ALI principles set forth the standards for judicial review of 
these claims by differentiating between actions raising duty of care issues 
and actions alleging violations of the duty of fair dealing.83 In compensation 
cases raising duty of care and waste claims, section 7.10(a)(1) provides that a 
decision by a disinterested board to move to dismiss the lawsuit will be 
protected by the business judgment rule.84 This standard of review will 
undoubtedly bar suits concerning compensation decisions when disinterested 
directors are uninformed about gross overreaching by executives.85 By 
contrast, for transactions alleging a breach of the duty of fair dealing, such as 
claims of a breach of the duty of loyalty, courts are urged to scrutinize the 
boards’ actions more closely.86 
The executive compensation provisions of the ALI Principles have been 
widely criticized.87 For example, Professor John Coffee recently stated that 
the drafters of the executive compensation provisions were not sufficiently 
aware of how important executive compensation is in aligning managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests.88 Others have claimed that board compensation 
committees have done a poor job meeting the standards set in the ALI 
Principles by, among other things, not sufficiently tying pay to 
performance.89 In any event, the proposals appear unlikely to increase the 
success rate of shareholder derivative litigation challenging executive 
compensation decisions. 
 
 
 83. Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 7.10(a)(1), with ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, 
§ 7.10(a)(2). 
 84. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, § 7.10(a)(1). See also Cox, supra note 74, at 1251 (noting 
that the ALI’s goals are to limit the derivative suit to instances of illegal behavior, unfair dealing, and 
self-dealing). 
 85. See Cox, supra note 74, at 1253 (arguing that the ALI should have approached the issue 
“accentuat[ing] the seriousness with which [they] view the outside directors’ obligation to respond to 
overreaching”). 
 86. As Professor Cox has noted, the ALI Principles are more concerned with the nature of the 
suit than with the interestedness or disinterestedness of the directors. If the suit involves a business 
decision which would normally be protected by the business judgment rule, the same rule will protect 
the directors in disfavoring the claim. If, on the other hand, the suit involves activities, such as self-
dealing, which are not protected by the business judgment rule, decisions disfavoring the claim will be 
given less protection. See Cox, supra note 74, at 1251 (stating that this distinction is “pure sophistry”). 
 87. See American Law Institute’s Principles Widely Accepted by Boards, Courts, U.S.L.W., Aug. 
25, 1998, at 2105-06 (comments of John C. Coffee Jr. and John T. Subak at the American Bar 
Association’s 1998 Annual Meeting). 
 88. Coffee was critical of the ALI’s relaxed business judgment standard of review. Id. at 2106. 
 89. Id. 
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B. The Delaware Supreme Court’s Brehm v. Eisner Decision 
The Delaware Supreme Court recently issued a major opinion concerning 
shareholder challenges to board compensation decisions, Brehm v. Eisner.90 
This decision affirmed a Chancery Court’s dismissal of a complaint91 
attacking a decision by the board of the Walt Disney Company (Disney) to 
pay a departing executive very large severance payments. The Disney board 
had approved a “Non-Fault Termination” of Michael S. Ovitz, thereby 
triggering the payment of a ten million dollar lump sum payment, a payment 
equal to the present value of all his remaining salary payments for the term of 
his employment contract, an additional payment equal to “the product of $7.5 
million times the number of fiscal years remaining under the [employment] 
Agreement (i.e., Ovitz’s approximate forgone bonuses),” and the immediate 
vesting of three million stock options for Disney shares.92 The Chancellor 
granted with prejudice the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to plead demand futility and failure to state a claim. 
The Delaware Supreme Court began by reviewing de novo the allegations 
of the complaint that demand on the board was futile.93 Applying the 
Aronson test for establishing demand futility, the Court looked to see if the 
plaintiffs had made an adequate claim either that a majority of the board was 
interested in the transaction, or that the board’s decision was not the product 
of a valid exercise of business judgment.94  
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the majority of the board 
was interested in the transaction, principally focusing on the claim that 
Michael D. Eisner, the CEO of Disney, was interested in the transaction and 
that he dominated and controlled the board of Disney to such an extent that 
the directors could not exercise independent business judgment.95 It affirmed 
the lower court’s dismissal of these claims with prejudice. 
The more interesting part of the decision is its analysis of the second 
Aronson prong, that is, whether the board had breached their duty of care or 
committed waste in approving the termination payments. The complaint 
alleged that the board was uninformed because the directors did not know the 
 
 
 90. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 91. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998). The Supreme Court’s 
dismissal was without prejudice though, thereby giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to file their 
complaint again.  
 92. Id. at 352. 
 93. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-54. In deciding to do so, the court overruled previous cases finding 
that such review should be deferential to the lower court’s findings. 
 94. Id. at 255. 
 95. Id. at 257-58. 
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value of the Ovitz termination payments when they approved his 
employment agreement.96 It cited subsequent statements made by the board’s 
compensation consultant, Graef Crystal, that he had failed to calculate the 
value of these payments and wished that he had. The complaint also alleged 
that the board had committed waste by granting Ovitz a no-fault termination 
when he had effectively resigned from the company or could have been 
terminated for cause. 
The court’s analysis began with the statement: 
Pre-suit demand will be excused in a derivative suit only if the Court 
of Chancery in the first instance, and this Court in its de novo review, 
conclude that the particularized facts in the complaint create a 
reasonable doubt that the informational component of the directors’ 
decisionmaking process, measured by concepts of gross negligence, 
included consideration of all material information reasonably 
available.97 
The court found that the size of the termination payments to Ovitz was 
material information for purposes of the directors’ decision making process 
and was reasonably available to the board of directors.98 The court went on to 
read the complaint as stating that no one had calculated the value of the 
severance package, including the board and its expert.99  
However, the court suggested that the question raised by the complaint 
was whether the directors were protected from liability because of a good 
faith reliance on a qualified expert. It found that the complaint did not rebut 
the presumption that the board was entitled to such protection. The Court 
therefore dismissed the claim, although it permitted the plaintiffs an 
opportunity to replead it.100 
In regard to the plaintiffs’ waste claims, the court reaffirmed that the 
waste test is satisfied only by “an exchange that is so one sided that no 
 
 
 96. In fact, the complaint included several quoted statements to this effect by Graef Crystal, the 
financial expert who advised the board about the agreement. Id. at 251. 
 97. Id. at 259. 
 98. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259-60. In an accompanying footnote, the court states that materiality in 
this context means information that is “relevant and of a magnitude to be important to directors in 
carrying out their fiduciary duty of care in decisionmaking.” Id. at 259 n.49. 
 99. Id. at 260. 
 100. Id. at 262. In this regard, the court does provide plaintiffs with a roadmap of the allegations 
needed to survive a motion to dismiss in a due care case where a board has been advised by an expert. 
Interestingly, the court includes the possibility that a complaint could allege that “the subject matter (in 
this case the cost calculation) that was material and reasonably available was so obvious that the 
board’s failure to consider it was grossly negligent regardless of the expert’s advice or lack of advice 
. . . .” Id. It is unclear why the complaint in this case did not support an allegation of this type on a 
motion to dismiss where all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiffs’ favor. 
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business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”101 The Court went on to 
say that these cases are “confined to unconscionable cases where directors 
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.”102 Construing the 
complaint, the court found that while it could be read to say that the Disney 
board could have negotiated a better deal on Ovitz’s termination because of 
his claimed decision to resign and the Board’s potential grounds for 
terminating him for cause, this was not sufficient to find that the board had 
committed waste. Again, the court dismissed the claim without prejudice.103 
Does the Brehm decision open new doors to plaintiffs seeking to 
challenge compensation packages? The court’s analysis of the informational 
requirements for the application of the duty of care may be helpful to 
plaintiffs in some cases. The court’s statements that the very large size of the 
payouts to Ovitz made them material information to directors would seem to 
be applicable in challenges to large executive pay packages.104 Furthermore, 
the court’s finding that the information was reasonably available to the board 
if either the compensation consultant, or the directors, could have calculated 
it, should also make it easier to claim that the board needed to consider this 
type of information to satisfy the pleading requirements of the duty of care.  
However, plaintiffs will rarely be able to plead informational deficiencies 
in what directors were told concerning a compensation package without the 
use of discovery. Thus, the court’s discussion of the informational 
requirements of procedural due process may be of limited use in helping 
plaintiffs overcome the demand requirement.105  
The remainder of the court’s opinion has little to offer plaintiffs. The 
court takes pains to point out that should the plaintiffs choose to file an 
amended complaint, the defendant directors could claim that they relied in 
good faith on the advice of their expert under the Delaware corporate code.106 
Furthermore, the court’s finding that the plaintiffs had not met the pleading 
 
 
 101. Id. at 263 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 362 (quoting 
Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993))). It agreed with the Chancellor that “the 
size and structure of executive compensation are inherently matters of judgment.” Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. It is interesting that the court does not cite any of its earlier cases holding that waste claims 
are not usually subject to disposition on motions to dismiss. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 
223 (Del. 1979). 
 104. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259. 
 105. For a discussion of the court’s opinion of using the Delaware books and records statute to 
uncover further evidence of wrongdoing, see supra note 36. 
 106. At public corporations, compensation committees routinely use compensation consultants to 
advise them on the size and composition of executive pay packages. However, this procedure is less 
frequently true at closely held companies. As a result, Brehm may be more helpful to shareholders at 
close companies. 
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requirements for demand futility may indicate some hostility to these cases. 
Justice Hartnett’s concurring opinion is, in essence, a dissent on this basis. 
He concludes that the plaintiffs ought to be entitled to limited discovery 
based on the allegations of the complaint.107 While the majority does give the 
plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint, its opinion goes out of its way 
to warn plaintiffs’ counsel that Rule 11 will apply to any amended 
complaint.108 It is hard to construe such a warning as encouragement to 
continue to press the litigation.  
Brehm v. Eisner seems to show a hostility by the Delaware Supreme 
Court to executive compensation claims. Faced with a fact pattern that seems 
to show an uninformed board approving a very large payment to a departing 
executive on the thinnest of business justifications, the court would not even 
allow the plaintiffs to engage in discovery on their claims. While we can only 
speculate about how another court would have handled the same case, our 
data suggest that, at least on the waste claim, the plaintiffs might have 
received better treatment elsewhere. 
IV. SHOULD WE HAVE DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION? 
A number of commentators have argued that we need stricter standards of 
judicial review in cases challenging executive compensation in order to 
reform the executive compensation process.109 They argue that the existing 
waste doctrine encourages corporate counsel to delegate all decision making 
to disinterested directors, to give them plenty of information, and to hire 
external experts,110 but does push directors to take hard positions in pay 
negotiations. These critics believe that if corporate counsel were afraid of 
having the board’s decisions seriously reviewed by a court with directors 
potentially being held personally liable, counsel would advise executives to 
lower their compensation demands to more defensible levels.111 As Professor 
 
 
 107. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267-68. 
 108. Id. at 266. 
 109. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1899 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL: IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)) 
(proposing that courts use an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages); 
Detev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 
231, 252-61 (1983) (stating that courts should adopt approach used in tax and close corporation cases 
for testing reasonableness of compensation by comparing compensation levels with those of similar 
firms); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling 
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59 (1992) (same). 
 110. Yablon, supra note 109, at 1897. 
 111. Yablon, supra note 109, at 1897-1900. 
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Vagts wrote: “If the courts act, even occasionally, to trim compensation it 
will, in turn, be easier for compensation committees to tell executives that 
they simply cannot gratify their pocketbooks and egos as much as the 
executives demand.”112 
A number of existing bodies of law could be tapped to provide a stricter 
standard for judges to apply in executive compensation cases. Different 
commentators have suggested the reasonableness standard used in tax cases 
involving close corporation’s claims for deductions of executive 
compensation;113 and the proportionality test applied by Delaware courts in 
takeover cases.114 For example, in tax cases, courts have undertaken to 
understand the complexities of executive compensation plans in close 
corporations and to determine what constitutes reasonable pay.115 While 
many appellate courts deciding these cases have used multifactor tests which 
can be difficult to apply consistently, at least one such court has adopted a 
“much simpler and more purposive test, the independent investor test.”116  
The arguments in favor of judicial intervention over executive pay are 
 
 
 112. Vagts, supra note 109, at 276. 
 113. Barris, supra note 109, at 87; Vagts, supra note 109, at 257-61. See, e.g., Labelgraphics, Inc. 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 221 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying five-factor test to determine 
if the amount of compensation paid to a corporate executive was reasonable); Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952) (comparing compensation levels within 
the brewing industry in combination with sales, costs, and experience of executives and concluding 
that compensation was reasonable). 
 114. Yablon, supra note 109, at 1897. For further discussion of the proportionality standard of 
judicial review in takeover cases, see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). The courts have not generally engaged in the degree of 
judicial scrutiny that many advocate. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Gordon D. Smith, Toward A 
New Theory of the Shareholder Role: Sacred Space in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2001). However, they do appear to be more concerned about the quality of board 
decision making than in the executive pay cases. 
 115. Compare Vagts, supra note 109, at 276 (arguing that these courts do a good job in making 
these determinations), with Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 833, 835 
(7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the application of a multifactor test for determining the reasonableness of 
executive compensation payments in a close corporation in part because of his belief that “[t]he judges 
of the Tax Court are not equipped by training or experience to determine the salaries of corporate 
officers; no judges are”). 
 116. Exacto Spring Corp., 196 F.3d at 838. The Exacto Spring Corp. decision “may have opened 
the door for more aggressive compensation planning . . . for key employees of closely held 
corporations.” Scott E. Vincent, Taxes in Your Practice: How Much Compensation is “Too Much?”—
New Focus on the Independent Investor Test, 56 J. MO. BAR 58, 58 (2000). This test considers the rate 
of return that investors are earning on their investment in the corporation at issue. A high rate of return 
indicates that the “independent investor” should be happy with the investment and therefore unlikely 
to object to the compensation paid to the company’s executives. Vincent, supra. For a more complete 
discussion of the independent investor test, as well as an argument that courts are moving to adopt it, 
see William Barnard, The Unreasonable Compensation Issue Rises From the Dead and Takes on the 
Independent Investor, 93 J. TAX’N 356 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/5
p569 Thomas.doc  12/20/2001   9:18 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] LITIGATING PAY CHALLENGES 601 
 
 
 
 
stronger for close corporations than for public companies. First, close 
corporations are different from public corporations in some important ways. 
They experience more potential conflicts of interest when resolving 
compensation issues than arise in public corporations. There are fewer 
outside directors, sometimes none, and this is reflected in the composition of 
the compensation committee. At public corporations, most compensation 
committees are comprised of outside directors, and fewer conflicts of interest 
arise. Courts need to look at close corporations more closely to ensure that 
there is no self-dealing.  
Moreover, there are usually fewer procedural safeguards observed at 
close corporations than at public ones. The more informal setting and smaller 
financial resources of many close corporations may result in less process 
being utilized in corporate decision making. The duty of care and its 
procedural requirements provide less of a check on the boards of close 
corporations in making their compensation decisions than they do at public 
corporations. 
Third, shareholders are probably better monitors of managerial abuses at 
close corporations because they are usually more directly involved with the 
company. Investors in these firms typically wear many hats as directors, 
officers, and employees. They have strong incentives to ensure that they are 
not being taken advantage of by their fellow investors.  
Finally, close corporations have clear incentives to try to minimize their 
tax bill by paying out excessive salaries to avoid distributing funds as 
nondeductible, double-taxed dividends. Because the managers of close 
corporations are also usually its shareholders, they care little about how they 
label distributions from the company as long as the money gets into their 
pocket. This trend is less true at public corporations, where there is a 
separation of ownership and control, because shareholders only receive 
distributions from the company if dividends are paid, even if they are subject 
to double taxation. Thus, while it makes sense in the tax cases to apply a 
stricter standard of judicial review to close corporations to ensure that the 
government is not being defrauded, these same concerns do not exist at 
public corporations.  
In the public corporation cases, as the data in this study plainly show, the 
courts have been more reluctant to intervene in executive compensation. 
Several justifications for the courts’ failure to regulate the substance of 
executive compensation decisions more closely emerge in the cases and 
commentaries. First, courts often claim they lack the competence to 
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determine executive compensation at public corporations.117 This rationale 
has limited validity. For years, courts have grappled with claims of excessive 
compensation in cases involving partnerships, insolvent corporations, and 
close corporations. As several commentators have observed, “In those cases, 
courts manage to find a fair market value for the services rendered.”118 While 
the officers at public corporations may have more complicated job functions, 
and the issues in these organizations may differ from those raised in the close 
corporate context, the fundamental question in each set of these cases is the 
same: has the board overpaid for the executive’s services? Judicial incapacity 
is at best a partial explanation for the courts’ unwillingness to examine 
critically pay at public corporations.119  
A more forceful argument is that courts are comparatively poor monitors 
of executive compensation.120 Boards of directors are better suited than 
courts for making determinations about the appropriate levels of executive 
compensation. Directors are more knowledgeable than judges about their 
companies’ needs and the market for executive talent. They, not the courts, 
should be responsible for determining the pay levels of officers. 
While few would contest the proposition that directors are better monitors 
in this area than judges, the more difficult issue is what should happen when 
boards fail to engage in adequate (or any) monitoring. In other words, what 
do we do when, for no apparent reason, boards hand out a pay package that 
far outstrips anything other companies are awarding?121 In the long run, 
sufficiently egregious abuses may be corrected by market forces.122 
 
 
 117. Yablon, supra note 109, at 1896 n.79. Yablon questions the claim that judges are 
incompetent to determine executive compensation, pointing out that judges routinely determine the 
value of a human life, damage to a person’s reputation, and other things that involve complex 
valuation issues. He also notes that courts have regularly determined the reasonableness of executive 
compensation in closely held corporations for tax purposes, and in cases involving the management 
fees paid out to mutual fund advisors. Id.  
 118. Barris, supra note 109, at 87 (citing Vagts, supra note 109, at 255-57). 
 119. This statement seems particularly true if the courts move toward adopting the “independent 
investor” test advocated by some appellate courts. See supra note 116 for further discussion. 
 120. Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance; An Academic 
Perspective, 792 PLI/CORP. 647, 672-73. 
Courts are the least suitable monitor of compensation decisions . . . . A court would be charged 
with evaluating the board’s judgment concerning the trade off between risk sharing and incentives. 
But because these are “local” decisions that not only lack a determinative conceptual framework, 
but depend on the peculiarities of particular companies and particular industries, it is difficult to 
imagine how a court bent on monitoring compensation decisions would proceed. 
Id. 
 121. Judges frequently claim that their role in evaluating executive pay packages should be limited 
because “[t]hat decision is for the stockholders to make in voting for directors, urging other 
stockholders to reform or oust the board, or in making individual buy-sell decisions involving . . . 
securities.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256. 
 122. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
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Alternatively, dissenting shareholders may choose to offer their own slate of 
directors and fight a proxy contest to replace the current board of directors. 
However, unless executive pay has a noticeable negative effect on the 
corporation’s bottom line, these forces are unlikely to be unleashed. And 
even at the highest paying public companies, the total amounts paid to all of 
the companies’ top executives amount to a minuscule percentage of the 
companies’ gross revenues. 
The number of other actors that have the power to check board abuses are 
few. Shareholders at public corporations have limited abilities to act as 
monitors of executive compensation, and even when they detect abuses, 
these investors face serious collective action problems in trying to mount 
effective opposition to them.123 While they have had some successes in 
influencing boards to reduce compensation levels, their influence is usually 
indirect and limited to those instances in which boards are responsive to 
shareholder initiatives.124 
Courts have the power to take immediate and direct action in cases when 
they are convinced that boards are abusing their power, particularly if they 
fail to follow appropriate procedures. For instance, in Sanders v. Wang,125 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery was convinced that the directors of Computer 
Associates, Inc. were misinterpreting executive compensation plans to 
unfairly enrich corporate officers, and it ordered the executives to repay the 
illegally obtained amounts.126 This type of monitoring of compliance with 
contractual terms and processes is often done by judges. 
Courts can use this power effectively against a broader set of abuses when 
they choose to do so. In tax cases, courts have demonstrated an ability to 
identify outlier compensation arrangements through the use of comparative 
compensation data. Thus, while there are good reasons to claim that courts 
should not routinely review executive compensation decisions, they may be 
the best of a bad set of choices for detecting and correcting serious abuses.127 
 
 
Activism By Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1083-84 (1998). For example, product and capital 
markets will punish firms that raise their costs too high.  
 123. Thomas & Martin, supra note 1.  
 124. Id. at 1069. 
 125. Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1999). 
 126. Id. at *40. 
 127. One unintended consequence of such monitoring may be herding behavior, whereby all 
boards seek to insure that they pay their executives within a range set by what other firms are paying. 
Marcel Kahan, Economics and Law, Networks and Norms: An Analysis of the Incentive Structure of 
the Corporation 36-37 (2000) (working paper, on file with author). This type of reaction appears to 
inflate executive pay levels even further as boards ratchet up pay levels to stay within the pack. John 
M. Bizjak et al., Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of Executive 
Compensation? (Nov. 15, 2000) (working paper, on file with authors). 
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On top of these concerns, creating stronger standards of judicial review 
may lead to an increase in the number of challenges to executive 
compensation by the shareholder plaintiffs’ bar.128 This development is a 
difficult objection to evaluate. On the one hand, raising the likelihood of 
success in executive compensation suits should increase the expected value 
of this type of litigation, and lead rational plaintiffs’ lawyers to file more of 
these cases. More litigation costs will be incurred by the parties, and these 
costs will be at least in part borne by the corporation. Shareholder value may 
suffer as a result. 
On the other hand, more challenges to executive compensation packages 
may deter wrongdoing by some boards and eliminate abusive practices that 
would have otherwise gone uncorrected. Furthermore, directors will have a 
stronger hand in their negotiations with company insiders, and this may lead 
to a lower rate of increase of executive pay at all companies and fewer abuses 
of the process. Shareholders would presumably benefit from these changes. 
Furthermore, potential legal liability to shareholders for executive 
compensation abuses can stimulate directors to become aggressive monitors 
of all types of managerial misconduct and overreaching. This liability can 
also be justified on the grounds that directors who knowingly participate or 
acquiesce in managerial misconduct or overreaching are as blameworthy as 
the managers who gain directly from the violation.129 
To summarize, we believe that the strongest case in favor of courts 
looking closely at executive pay at public corporations is that they are best 
positioned to police abuses of the executive compensation process. This 
proposition seems relatively uncontroversial as courts have repeatedly 
demonstrated their proficiency at ensuring that procedural steps and 
contractual terms are followed.130  
A more difficult argument can be made in favor of courts policing the 
substance of outlier pay packages. This proposal is more likely to provoke 
claims of judicial incapacity and overreaching. However, courts have 
determined when pay packages deviate substantially from the norm at close 
corporations in tax cases. Similar information is easily available at public 
corporations, where compensation committees routinely use surveys of 
comparable pay from other companies in setting pay levels for their top 
executives. These surveys clearly indicate the range of pay received by each 
individual CEO at many different companies. Courts should require 
 
 
 128. Yablon, supra note 109, at 1901-02. Yablon argues that increased costs are unlikely to arise 
from more stringent standards of judicial review. 
 129. Cox, supra note 74, at 1245. 
 130. See, e.g., Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, 1999 Del. Ch. Lexis 203 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1999). 
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companies to justify pay levels that deviate far from the median levels by 
extraordinary performance or other special circumstances.  
While this change would do little to stop the apparently inexorable rise in 
the levels of executive pay over the last decade, it would give angry 
shareholders a more direct method of challenging extraordinary pay 
packages. However, enacting even modest changes like this will require 
action either by legislatures or courts. We view the likelihood of such action 
as remote. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Litigation challenging executive compensation at corporations has been 
more successful than is commonly perceived. Our main findings are that 
plaintiffs have higher success rates at close corporations than at public 
companies, and that plaintiffs succeed more frequently outside of Delaware 
than in Delaware, although this latter result is apparently caused by the 
Delaware courts handling a greater percentage of public company cases than 
other courts. 
Nevertheless, derivative suits do not generally appear to be a strong check 
on executive pay levels. Moreover, though many shareholders are frustrated 
by both the courts’ reluctance to enter into the business of determining what 
constitute reasonable levels of compensation, and the state legislatures’ lack 
of interest in creating legislative guidelines, they are unlikely to see any 
differences in the foreseeable future. If they want to challenge executive pay 
more forcefully, we believe that they will need to find alternative methods of 
policing executive compensation practices.  
Shareholder voting and selling decisions are unlikely to be fruitful 
approaches. Shareholders’ ability to take direct action is very limited and has 
been largely ineffective to date. In the voting area, shareholder proposals and 
coordinated campaigns against company stock option plans have met with 
only limited success.131 There is little evidence that investors sell their shares, 
or mount effective campaigns to remove boards, because of concerns about 
executive compensation.  
One interpretation of these facts is that executive compensation is not an 
important issue to investors today. Shareholders may accept boards’ claims 
that the current high levels of CEO pay are justified as pay for performance, 
or necessary to retain talented executives in a tight international labor market. 
Until recently, long running bull stock market may explain the tremendous 
 
 
 131. Thomas & Martin, supra note 2. 
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value of the stock option grants that boards have awarded to executives. 
Shareholders who do not accept those claims may want to seek to 
strengthen existing approaches to influencing executive compensation 
directly through coordinated voting and selling campaigns. However, if they 
want to have a more immediate impact on the size and composition of 
executive pay packages, investors need to shift their focus onto other factors 
that directly affect current compensation practices, such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) liberal accounting treatment of stock 
options132 and the SEC’s failure to bar executives from engaging in hedging 
transactions on their stock options.133 These practices have been the subject 
of much well-deserved criticism, although neither the FASB nor the SEC has 
been willing to force changes to the status quo. Alternatively, shareholders 
could urge boards of directors to substitute indexed options in the place of 
those currently employed at almost all corporations. This action would tie 
pay and performance for corporate executives more effectively,134 and it 
might also reduce the size of realized gains on option packages.  
 
 
 132. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms 7 (Nov. 1, 2000) (working 
paper, on file with author). See also Kahan, supra note 127, at 39. 
 133. David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive 
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 461 (2000). 
 134. BRIAN J. HALL, A Better Way to Pay CEOs?, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Jennifer Carpenter & David Yermack eds., 1999). 
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VI. APPENDIX: TABLES 1-12 
 
Table 1: Demand Futility 
Number of times futility raised / Total number of cases (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Pre-Aronson 3 / 21 (14%) 9 / 50 (18%) 12 / 71 (17%) 
 
Post-Aronson 18 / 24 (75%) 7 / 29 (24%) 25 / 53 (47%) 
 
Total 21 / 45 (47%) 16 / 79 (20%) 37 / 124 (30%) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Demand Futility 
Number of plaintiff wins using futility / Total number of times futility raised (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Pre-Aronson 1 / 3 (33%) 4 / 9 (44%) 5 / 12 (42%) 
 
Post-Aronson 7 / 18 (39%) 3 / 7 (43%) 10 / 25 (40%) 
 
Total 8 / 21 (38%) 7 / 16 (44%) 15 / 37 (41%) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Duty of Care 
Number of plaintiff wins using duty of care / Total number of times duty of 
care raised (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Pre-Van Gorkom 0 / 2 (0%) 1 / 2 (50%) 1 / 4 (25%) 
 
Post-Van Gorkom 3 / 9 (33%) 2 / 7 (29%) 5 / 16 (31%) 
 
Total 3 / 11 (27%) 3 / 9 (33%) 6 / 20 (30%) 
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Table 4: Duty of Care 
Number of plaintiff wins using duty of care / Total number of times duty of 
care raised (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Public corporation 2 / 8 (25%) 1 / 5 (20%) 3 / 13 (23%) 
 
Close corporation 1 / 3 (33%) 2 / 4 (50%) 3 / 7 (43%) 
 
Total 3 / 11 (27%) 3 / 9 (33%) 6 / 20 (30%) 
  Chi-square p-value 
Public v. Close corporation 0.848 0.357 
 
Delaware v. Non-Delaware 0.087 0.769 
 
 
 
Table 5: Waste 
Number of plaintiff wins using waste / Total number of times waste raised (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Public corporation 8 / 28 (29%) 8 / 22 (36%) 16 / 50 (32%) 
 
Close corporation 2 / 6 (33%) 21 / 41 (51%) 23 / 47 (49%) 
 
Total 10 / 34 (29%) 29 / 63 (45%) 39 / 97 (40%) 
 Chi-square p-value 
Public v. Close corporation  2.891 0.089 
 
Delaware v. Non-Delaware 2.537 0.111 
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Table 6: Waste 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Number of plaintiff 
wins using waste / 
Number of times any 
other claim succeeds 
 
5 / 11 (45%) 
 
20 / 24 (83%) 
 
25 / 35 (71%) 
 
 
 
 
Number of plaintiff 
wins using waste / 
Number of times all 
other claims fail or no 
other claims made 
 
 
5 / 34 (15%) 
 
 
11 / 55 (20%) 
 
 
16 / 89 (18%) 
 
 
 
Total 10 / 45 (22%) 31 / 79 (39%) 41 / 124 (33%) 
 
 
 
Table 7: Duty of Loyalty 
Number of plaintiff wins using duty of loyalty / Total number of times duty 
of loyalty raised (%) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Public corporation 5 / 20 (25%) 1 / 19 (5%) 6 / 39 (15%) 
 
Close corporation 3 / 7 (43%) 20 / 36 (56%) 23 / 43 (53%) 
 
Total 8 / 27 (30%) 21 / 55 (38%) 29 / 82 (35%) 
 Chi-square p-value 
Public v. Close corporation 12.99 0.001 
 
Delaware v. Non-Delaware 0.579 0.447 
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Table 8 
Number of plaintiff wins / Total number of times used (%) 
  
Futility 
Motion to 
Dismiss 
Summary 
Judgment 
 
Trial 
 
Appeal 
Public 
corporation 
7 / 23 (30%) 6 / 29 (21%) 2 / 12 (17%) 6 / 20 (30%) 7 / 21 (33%) 
 
 
Close 
corporation 
8 / 13 (62%) 5 / 13 (38%) 3 / 6 (50%) 16 / 36 (44%) 14 / 33 (42%) 
 
 
Total 15 / 36 (42%) 11 / 42 (26%) 5 / 18 (28%) 22 / 56 (39%) 21 / 54 (39%) 
 
Chi-square 3.306 1.467 2.215 1.125 0.446 
(p-value) (0.069) (0.226) (0.137) (0.289) (0.504) 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Number of plaintiff wins / Total number of times used (%) 
 Duty of 
Care 
 
Waste 
Duty of 
Loyalty 
Any of 3 
Reasons 
Delaware 3 / 11 (27%) 10 / 36 (28%) 8 / 29 (28%) 16 / 44 (36%) 
Non-Delaware 3 / 9 (33%) 31 / 67 (46%) 22 / 57 (39%) 35 / 77 (45%) 
Total 6 / 20 (30%) 41 / 103 (40%) 30 / 86 (35%) 51 / 121 (42%) 
Delaware v. Non-Delaware Cases: 
 
  
Chi-square 0.087 3.342 1.026 0.949 
(p-value) (0.769) (0.068) (0.311) (0.330) 
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Table 10 
Number of plaintiff wins / Total number of cases 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Public corporation 12 / 35 (34%) 8 / 27 (30%) 20 / 62 (32%) 
 
Close corporation 4 / 8 (50%) 25 / 47 (53%) 29 / 55 (53%) 
 
Total 16 / 43 (37%) 33 / 74 (45%) 49 / 117 (42%) 
Chi-square (p-value): Delaware v. Non-Delaware corporations: 0.609 (0.435) 
 
Chi-square (p-value): Public corporations: Delaware v. Non-Delaware corporations: 0.151 (0.697) 
 
Chi-square (p-value): Close corporations: Delaware v. Non-Delaware corporations: 0.028 (0.867) 
Chi-square (p-value): Public v. Close corporations: 5.017 (0.025) 
 
Chi-square (p-value): Delaware: Public v. Close corporations: 0.688 (0.407) 
 
Chi-square (p-value): Non-Delaware: Public v. Close corporations: 3.853 (0.050) 
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: PWINS = 1 if plaintiff wins using duty of care, duty of 
loyalty, or waste (p-values in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2)  
Intercept 0.0950 0.1278  
 (0.7323) (0.6619)  
 
DELWRE 0.0979   
 (0.8266)   
 
PUBLIC -0.8926   
 (0.0372**)   
 
DELPUBLIC  -0.7784  
  (0.0911*)  
 
DELCLOSE  -0.1278  
  (0.8673)  
 
NONDELPUBLIC  -0.9928  
  (0.0529*)  
 
Chi-square 5.092 5.223  
(p-value) (0.0784) (0.1562)  
*,** statistically significant at the.10 and .05 levels, respectively 
 
Variables: 
DELWRE = 1 if Delaware case, 0 otherwise 
PUBLIC = 1 if public corporation, 0 if closely-held corporation 
DELPUBLIC = 1 if Delaware case and public corporation, 0 otherwise 
DELCLOSE = 1 if Delaware case and closely-held corporation, 0 otherwise 
NONDELPUBLIC = 1 if non- Delaware case and public corporation, 0 otherwise 
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Table 12: Impact of Shareholder Ratification 
Number of plaintiff wins using duty of loyalty, care, or waste in shareholder 
ratification cases (% of cases) 
 Delaware Cases Non-Delaware Cases Total 
Shareholder 
ratification 
effective 
2 / 13 (15%) 0 / 11 (0%) 2 / 24 (8%) 
 
 
 
Shareholder 
ratification 
ineffective 
3 / 3 (100%) 4 / 4 (100%) 7 / 7 (100%) 
 
 
 
Total 5 / 16 (31%) 4 / 15 (27%) 9 / 31 (29%) 
 Chi-square p-value 
Shareholder ratification 
effective v. ineffective 
 
22.102 
 
0.001 
 
Delaware v. Non-Delaware 0.079 0.779 
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